



## Mark Carneys tale ved det årlige møde i World Economic Forum

**Taler**  
Mark Carney  
Premierminister i Canada

**Dato**  
20. januar 2026

**Sted**  
Davos, Schweiz

1 Thank you, Larry.

*It's a pleasure – and a duty – to be with you tonight in this pivotal moment that Canada and the world are going through.*

5

*Tonight, I'll talk about a rupture in the world order, the end of a pleasant fiction, and the beginning of a harsh reality where geopolitics – where the large, main power – is submitted to no limits, no constraints. On the other hand, I would like to tell you that the other countries, particularly intermediate powers like Canada,*

10

*are not powerless.*

*They have the capacity to build a new order that encompasses our values, like respect for human rights, sustainable development, solidarity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the various states. The power of the less power starts with honesty.\**

15

\*[Den kursiverede del af talen blev holdt på fransk og simultanoversat til engelsk, red.]

20 It seems that every day we are reminded that we live in an era of great power rivalry. That the rules-based order is fading. That the strong do what they can, and the weak must suffer what they must.

25

This aphorism of Thucydides is presented as inevitable – the natural logic of international relations reasserting itself. And faced with this logic, there is a strong tendency for countries to go along to get along. To accommodate. To avoid trouble. To hope that compliance will buy safety.

30 Well, it won't.

So, what are our options?

In 1978, the Czech dissident Václav Havel, later president, wrote an essay called  
35 *The Power of the Powerless*. In it, he asked a simple question: how did the communist system sustain itself?

His answer began with a greengrocer. Every morning, this shopkeeper places a sign in his window: "Workers of the world, unite!" He does not believe it. No  
40 one believes it. But he places the sign anyway – to avoid trouble, to signal compliance, to get along. And because every shopkeeper on every street does the same, the system persists.

Not through violence alone, but through the participation of ordinary people  
45 in rituals they privately know to be false.

Havel called this "living within a lie." The system's power comes not from its truth but from everyone's willingness to perform as if it were true. And its fragility comes from the same source: when even one person stops performing –  
50 when the greengrocer removes his sign – the illusion begins to crack.

Friends, it is time for companies and countries to take their signs down.

For decades, countries like Canada prospered under what we called the rules-  
55 based international order. We joined its institutions, we praised its principles, we benefited from its predictability. And because of that, we could pursue values-based foreign policies under its protection.

We knew the story of the international rules-based order was partially false.  
60 That the strongest would exempt themselves when convenient. That trade rules were enforced asymmetrically. And we knew that international law applied with varying rigour depending on the identity of the accused or the victim.

This fiction was useful, and American hegemony, in particular, helped provide  
65 public goods: open sea lanes, a stable financial system, collective security, and support for frameworks for resolving disputes.

70 So, we placed the sign in the window. We participated in the rituals, and we largely avoided calling out the gaps between rhetoric and reality.

This bargain no longer works.

75 Let me be direct. We are in the midst of a rupture, not a transition.

Over the past two decades, a series of crises in finance, health, energy, and geopolitics have laid bare the risks of extreme global integration.

80 More recently, great powers have begun using economic integration as weapons, tariffs as leverage, financial infrastructure as coercion, and supply chains as vulnerabilities to be exploited.

You cannot “live within the lie” of mutual benefit through integration when integration becomes the source of your subordination.

85 The multilateral institutions on which the middle powers have relied – the WTO, the UN, the COP – the architecture, the very architecture of collective problem solving – are under threat.

90 As a result, many countries are drawing the same conclusions. They must develop greater strategic autonomy: in energy, food, critical minerals, in finance, and supply chains.

95 This impulse is understandable. A country that cannot feed itself, fuel itself, or defend itself has few options. When the rules no longer protect you, you must protect yourself.

But let us be clear-eyed about where this leads. A world of fortresses will be poorer, more fragile, and less sustainable.

100 And there is another truth. If great powers abandon even the pretence of rules and values for the unhindered pursuit of their power and interests, the gains from transactionalism will become harder to replicate. Hegemons cannot continually monetise their relationships.

105 Allies will diversify to hedge against uncertainty. They’ll buy insurance, increase

options, in order to rebuild sovereignty – sovereignty that was once grounded in rules, but will increasingly be anchored in the ability to withstand pressure.

110

This room knows this is classic risk management. Risk management comes at a price, but that cost of strategic autonomy, of sovereignty, can also be shared. Collective investments in resilience are cheaper than everyone building their own fortresses. Shared standards reduce fragmentation. Complementarities are positive sum.

115

The question for middle powers, like Canada, is not whether to adapt to this new reality. We must. The question is whether we adapt by simply building higher walls – or whether we can do something more ambitious.

120

Now, Canada was amongst the first to hear the wake-up call, leading us to fundamentally shift our strategic posture.

Canadians know that our old, comfortable assumptions that our geography and alliance memberships automatically conferred prosperity and security – that assumption is no longer valid.

125

Our new approach rests on what Alexander Stubb, the President of Finland, has termed “value-based realism” – or, to put it another way, we aim to be both **principled and pragmatic**.

130

Principled in our commitment to fundamental values: sovereignty and territorial integrity, the prohibition of the use of force except when consistent with the UN Charter, and respect for human rights.

135

Pragmatic in recognising that progress is often incremental, that interests diverge, that not every partner will share all of our values. We are engaging broadly, strategically, with open eyes. We actively take on the world as it is, not wait for a world we wish to be.

140

We are calibrating our relationships so their depth reflects our values. We are prioritising broad engagement to maximise our influence, given the fluidity of the world order, the risks that this poses, and the stakes for what comes next.

145

We are no longer just relying on the strength of our values, but also the value of

our strength.

### **We are building that strength at home.**

150

Since my government took office, we have cut taxes on incomes, capital gains and business investment, we have removed all federal barriers to interprovincial trade, and we are fast-tracking a trillion dollars of investment in energy, AI, critical minerals, new trade corridors, and beyond.

155

We are doubling our defence spending by the end of this decade, and we are doing so in ways that build our domestic industries.

160

We are rapidly diversifying abroad. We have agreed a comprehensive strategic partnership with the European Union, including joining SAFE, Europe's defence procurement arrangements.

We have signed twelve other trade and security deals on four continents in the last six months.

165

In the past few days, we have concluded new strategic partnerships with China and Qatar.

170

We are negotiating free trade pacts with India, ASEAN, Thailand, Philippines, and Mercosur.

175

We're doing something else. To help solve global problems, **we are pursuing variable geometry**. In other words, different coalitions for different issues, based on common values and interests.

180

So, on Ukraine, we are a core member of the Coalition of the Willing and one of the largest per-capita contributors to its defence and security.

On Arctic sovereignty, we stand firmly with Greenland and Denmark and fully support their unique right to determine Greenland's future. Our commitment to NATO Article 5 is unwavering.

We are working with our NATO allies (including the Nordic Baltic 8) to further secure the alliance's northern and western flanks, including through

Canada's unprecedented investments in over-the-horizon radar, submarines, in aircraft, and boots on the ground, boots on the ice. Canada strongly opposes tariffs over Greenland and calls for focused talks to achieve our shared objectives of security and prosperity in the Arctic.

190

On plurilateral trade, we are championing efforts to build a bridge between the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the European Union, which would create a new trading bloc of 1.5 billion people.

195 **On critical minerals**, we are forming buyers' clubs anchored in the G7 so that the world can diversify away from concentrated supply.

On AI, we are cooperating with like-minded democracies to ensure we will not ultimately be forced to choose between hegemons and hyperscalers.

200

This is not naive multilateralism. Nor is it relying on their institutions. It is building the coalitions that work, issue by issue, with partners who share enough common ground to act together. In some cases, this will be the vast majority of nations.

205

And it is creating a dense web of connections across trade, investment, culture on which we can draw for future challenges and opportunities.

Middle powers must act together because if you are not at the table, you are on the menu.

210

But I would also say that Great powers can afford to go it alone. They have the market size, the military capacity, and the leverage to dictate terms. Middle powers do not. But when we only negotiate bilaterally with a hegemon, we negotiate from weakness. We accept what is offered. We compete with each other to be the most accommodating.

215

This is not sovereignty. It is the performance of sovereignty while accepting subordination.

220

In a world of great power rivalry, the countries in between have a choice: to compete with each other for favour or to combine to create a third path with impact.

We should not allow the rise of hard power to blind us to the fact that the power of legitimacy, integrity, and rules will remain strong — if we choose to wield it together.

230 Which brings me back to Havel.

What would it mean for middle powers to “live the truth”?

235 **First, it means naming reality.** Stop invoking “rules-based international order” as though it still functions as advertised. Call it what it is: a system of intensifying great power rivalry, where the most powerful pursue their interests using economic integration as coercion.

240 **It means acting consistently,** applying the same standards to allies and rivals. When middle powers criticize economic intimidation from one direction but stay silent when it comes from another, we are keeping the sign in the window.

245 It means **building what we claim to believe in**, rather than waiting for the old order to be restored. It means creating institutions and agreements that function as described.

And it means **reducing the leverage that enables coercion.** Building a strong domestic economy should always be every government’s immediate priority. Diversification internationally is not just economic prudence; it is the material  
250 foundation for honest foreign policy, because countries earn the right to principled stands by reducing their vulnerability to retaliation.

255 Canada has what the world wants. We are an energy superpower. We hold vast reserves of critical minerals. We have the most educated population in the world. Our pension funds are amongst the world’s largest and most sophisticated investors. In other words, we have capital, talent, and a government with the immense fiscal capacity to act decisively.

260 And we have the values to which many others aspire.

Canada is a pluralistic society that works. Our public square is loud, diverse, and free. Canadians remain committed to sustainability.

265 We are a stable, reliable partner – in a world that is anything but—a partner that builds and values relationships for the long term.

Canada has something else: a recognition of what is happening and a determination to act accordingly.

270

We understand that this rupture calls for more than adaptation. It calls for honesty about the world as it is.

We are taking the sign out of the window.

275

We know the old order is not coming back. We should not mourn it. Nostalgia is not a strategy.

280

But we believe that from the fracture, we can build something better, stronger, and more just.

This is the task of the middle powers, the countries that have the most to lose from a world of fortresses and the most to gain from a world of genuine cooperation.

285

The powerful have their power. But we have something too – the capacity to stop pretending, to name reality, to build our strength at home, and to act together.

290

That is Canada's path. We choose it openly and confidently.

And it is a path wide open to any country willing to take it with us.

Thank you very much.

295

#### **Kilde**

Manuskript taget fra [www.pm.gc.ca](http://www.pm.gc.ca) og udgivet af Danske Taler

#### **Kildetype**

Digitalt manuskript

300

#### **Tags**



## Politisk tale

### URI

305 <https://www.dansketaler.dk/tale/mark-carneys-tale-ved-det-arlige-mode-i-world-economic-forum>

310

315

320

325

330

335

340